

sächlich an – scheinen die Erinyen wesenhaft besonders den *δαίμονες* nahezustehen²³). Sie wirken – meist im Verein mit den Göttern – als Hüter und Bewahrer göttlich-menschlicher Lebensordnungen; sie sind Helfer all derer, die des Schutzes und der Hilfe in besonderem Maße würdig und bedürftig sind. Diejenigen allerdings, die sowieso zu frevelhaftem Handeln neigen, treiben sie noch weiter an. Daß sie in ihrer Eigenschaft als Helfer meist die Aufgabe zu übernehmen haben, verletzte Grenzen wieder herzustellen und begangene Untat wieder gutzumachen, läßt sie in den Augen derer, die ihr strafendes Wirken erfahren, als Rachegöttinnen erscheinen; aber vermutlich stellt dieser eher negative Aspekt nicht das Eigentliche ihres Wesens dar. Insgesamt haftet ihrem Wesen etwas Unbegreifliches und wohl auch Unheimliches an, und wenn die einzelne Erinye an zwei wichtigen Stellen (I 571, T 87) als *ἡεροφοῖτις* bezeichnet wird, glauben wir das geheimnisvolle Dunkel zu spüren, das sie umgibt. Nicht minder bezeichnend ist aber auch die Komplexität ihres Wesens, von der wir gesprochen haben. Das Miteinander und Ineinander verschiedener Funktionen und Wirkungsbereiche ist es offensichtlich gewesen, daß dem Aischylos die Möglichkeit und die inneren Voraussetzungen gegeben hat, sein monumentales Bild zu zeichnen, in dem aus diesem Miteinander ein Nacheinander wird. Der Wandel der dämonischen Gestalten von unerbittlichen Rachegeistern zu gütigen Helfergottheiten, von den Erinyen zu den Eumeniden, ist in der Komplexität ihres voraischyloischen Bildes angelegt.

Two Homeric Formulae in the P. Lille Poem: *θεοὶ θέσαν* and *ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων* *

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Abstract

This work is devoted to the semasiological study of the Homeric formulae in

²³) Zur Daimonen-Vorstellung vgl. zuletzt W. Burkert, a. O. 278–282; O. Tsagarakis, a. a. O. 98–116; H. Erbse, Untersuchungen, 259–265.

*) This paper is an amplified and often revised part of my dissertation “Stesichorus and his poetry,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1985), pp. 116–132.

the P. Lille Poem. Two basic assumptions – the Homeric formulae are carriers of meaning and Stesichorus knows the Homeric epics – are made and justified. The meaning of two metrically equivalent formulae – ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων and ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων is examined in particular with the purpose of suggesting that Stesichorus uses the letter because he has recognized its potential to convey contradictory and ambiguous ideas – Apollo ἐκάεργος can be both protector and destroyer. Both formulae are shown to have been skillfully incorporated in the P. Lille Poem so as to create a climate of ambivalence and illusion.

The discovery of the P. Lille poem (frs 76 abc, 73i), which is attributed to Stesichorus almost unanimously, has been accompanied by the efforts of scholars to illuminate the art of Stesichorus and to fill in the missing pieces in his poetic profile. From the linguistic point of view, the extensive use of Homeric expressions by Stesichorus has renewed the question of his indebtedness to Homer. Working on this problem, I will examine two Homeric formulae of the P. Lille poem – θεοὶ θέσαν and ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων – with the purpose of pointing out their *raison d'être* in the poem and how this reflects on Stesichorus.

To accomplish my goal I must establish the meaning of both formulae in Homer, starting with two basic assumptions. First that Homer should be understood as literature, and that his formulaic language – although in great part composed of stock phrases developed in the course of a long bardic tradition – should be viewed as a carrier of meaning.

The function of the Homeric epithet or noun-epithet formula has long been subject to controversy¹⁾ resumed in the thirties by M. Parry. M. Parry observes that the use of some Homeric epithets in some contexts is illogical and concludes, as did Duentzer before him, that the epithets are chosen not for their signification, but for their metrical value. M. Parry distinguishes two categories of epithets in Homer: a) generic epithets, which are fixed and ornamental, and b) particularized epithets. The epithets of the former category have lost their own value, add an element of nobility and grandeur, and thus ennoble the style. In his choice the poet is guided by considerations of versification and in no way by the sense.²⁾ The particularized

¹⁾ Since Aristarchus and the scholiasts; see M. Parry, *The Traditional epithet in Homer*, ch. 4, *The Meaning of the Epithet in Epic Poetry*, pp. 119–124 (hereafter cited as *TE*). All the subsequent references to M. Parry come from his work as published by Adam Parry, *The Making of the Homeric Verse. The Collected Papers of Milman Parry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

²⁾ M. Parry, *TE*, pp. 127–149.

epithets, however, are deemed by M. Parry as completing the thought of the sentence in which they appear and as attributing to the hero a quality which is peculiar to him. In the particularized epithets there is a consideration of metrical value as well as a conscious choice of a word.³⁾

M. Parry recognizes the conscious and purposive use of the particularized epithets indeed, but his insistence on the decorative character of the fixed epithets has been viewed with scepticism mainly for not "analyzing the interplay between formula as a device for oral composition and formula as a vehicle for meaning,"⁴⁾ since a closer study of the generic epithets suggests that they, too, are appropriate to the character and the subject which they adorn.⁵⁾

My second assumption is that Stesichorus knew Homer and was indebted to him on both linguistic and thematic levels. This appraisal has been a commonplace since antiquity, but it has been challenged recently by C. Gallavotti who believes that Stesichorus is not the follower of Homer, but his rival. The coincidence of formulae and other expressions in the work of both poets is not considered an imitation of Homer by Stesichorus, but vestiges of an older tradition of hymnic and narrative poetry or of popular and liturgical literature, on which both poets have drawn, each one in his own distinct manner. According to Gallavotti, the alliteration in the formula *θεοὶ θέσαν* betrays the hieratic origin of the phrase, and suggests that Stesichorus was influenced by hieratic literature. Peloponnesian lyric poetry and Hesiod are also considered to be sources of inspiration

³⁾ M. Parry, *TE*, pp. 153–165.

⁴⁾ So A. Amory Parry, *Blameless Aegisthus* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973 *Mnemosyne* Suppl. 26), p. 5. For a similar approach see Adam Parry, "The language of Achilles," *TAPA* 87 (1956): 1–7; id., "Have We Homer's Iliad?" *YCS* 20 (1966): 177–216; id., *The Making of the Homeric Verse*, Intro.; W. Whallon, "The Homeric Epithets," *YCS* 17 (1961): 97–142; C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (N. York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 102–127; G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 2–3, believes that "theme is the overarching principle in the creation of traditional poetry like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; also that the formulaic heritage of these compositions is an accurate expression of their thematic heritage."

⁵⁾ This view is objected to by J. B. Hainsworth, "Good and Bad Formulae," in *Homer. Tradition and Invention*, ed. B. C. Fenik (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978 *Cincinnati Classical Studies* N. S. vol. 2), pp. 45–50. Following in the steps of Hoekstra, Hainsworth discerns various stages in the maturity of the noun-epithet formulae for gods and a preference for the special epithets. His criterion for controlling the generic or special nature of an epithet is the productivity (*ibid.*, p. 47).

for Stesichorus, whereas the influence of Homer is negated on the ground that the Homeric epics were transferred West – together with the Ionian philosophy – at a much later date.⁶⁾

Gallavotti correctly associates Stesichorus with Peloponnesian lyric poetry and Hesiod. In this company I would like to add Italian literature, or to be more precise, the Italiot literature cultivated by the Greek colonists. However, Gallavotti's arguments for the exclusion of Homeric influence on Stesichorus deserve a closer look.

The first argument of Gallavotti involves the hieratic origins of the alliteration in *θεοὶ θέσαν* and the concomitant inference that Stesichorus was indebted to the language of the hieratic or liturgical literature. We have testimonies about Stesichorus' religious thematology (PMG 276 b,c) and evidence that alliteration (or assonance, in a wider sense) played an important role in his poetry,⁷⁾ but we have no way of tracing the origins of alliteration back to the genre of religious literature.⁸⁾ With the exception of an inscription from Pylos in which certain sounds are repeated in a possibly religious context,⁹⁾ no other pre-Homeric religious texts have been preserved.¹⁰⁾ Our ancient sources are all post-Homeric and even in those that are "religious," such as the *Homeric Hymns*, alliteration

⁶⁾ C. Gallavotti, "Da Stesicoro ad Empedocle," *Kokalos* 26–27 (1980–81): 413–433 esp. 413–419; id., "Un poemetto citarodico di Stesicoro nel quadro della cultura Siceliota," *BPEN* 25 (1977): 1–30, esp. 15–16. B. Gentili, "Preistoria e formazione dell'esametro," *QU* 26 (1977) with n. 52, explains the common expressions found in all the genres of ancient Greek literature as deriving from "una *koine* supperregionale di espressioni della poesia orale." G. Bagnone, "Aspetti formulari in Stesicoro, Pap. Lille 76 abc: il desiderio di morte," *QU* 39 (1982): 35–42, speaks of a "memoria poetica," of "Erinnerung," as well as of "nessi ... di tipo formulare, omerizante o tradizionale, come ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Απόλλων ..."

⁷⁾ I have dealt with this in my diss., pp. 144–147.

⁸⁾ Alliteration is frequent in Latin religious poetry; see *OCD* s.v. Assonance, 2nd ed., p. 132. But the period of earliest Latin (ca. 500–240 B.C.) is usually treated as pre-literary since there is a scarcity of genuine archaic texts, and those that originate in the 5th c. B.C. (e.g., the *Twelve Tables*) have been the object of a continuous elaboration; see J. W. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome from the Origins to the close of the Golden Age*, 2nd ed. corr. rep. (London: E. Benn Ltd., N. York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1960), pp. 18, 47–67.

⁹⁾ Pylos Ae 303: puro ijereja doera eneka kurusojo ijerojo (*Πύλοι ἱερείας δοῦλαι ἔνεκα χρυσοῖο ἱεροῖο*); see M. Gérard-Rousseau, *Les Mentions Religieuses dans les Tablettes Myceniennes* (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1968, *Incunabula Graeca*, vol. 29), pp. 21, 108–109, 112.

¹⁰⁾ W. Burkert, *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1977), p. 27.

and assonance is no more conspicuous than it is in heroic and secular poetry, such as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The Italic hieratic poetry, on the other hand, is a mystery since we have no evidence of the language used in it as early as the archaic age. The *Orphic Hymns*, which seem to have originated in that wider geographical area, do present a high degree of alliteration, but their date is debatable, and so is their demonstrative value. In the *Sacred Laws*, which date as late as the fifth century B. C., there is also a pronounced use of alliteration, and most remarkably, a repetition of words of the same root and of entire phrases with minimal or no change.¹¹⁾ There is a wealth of technical terms, of terminology pertaining to ritual, and information about local laws and regulations of financial or organizational nature. In this case we are confronted with a dilemma: should we class the *Sacred Laws* in the category of religious or of institutional-legal literature? It is incontestable that phrases such as *καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δαρτηδῶν τὰ δέρματα* (Nr. 11 B. 6., often repeated) and numerous others point to a religious origin; one may argue then that the language of religion is "arteriosclerotic" in the sense that it defies verbal innovations, and that the *Sacred Laws* hand down a traditional linguistic feature of religious literature. However, in view of the fact that no prayers from pre-Homeric or early archaic time have been preserved and that these *Laws* date as late as the beginning of the fifth century B. C., we should be careful with our characterizations; we lack the means of comparison that could possibly confirm the above inference. The mixed nature of these *Laws*, on the other hand, could urge one to interpret the repeated and echoed phrases as a specimen of those "*πανηγυρικαὶ ἐκφράσεις*" found in institutional rules.¹²⁾ The institutional associations of the texts at

¹¹⁾ F. Sokolowski, *Lois Sacrées des Cités Grecques* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1969), pp. 21–22 No. 11 A. 4, 14; p. 22 B. 6, 11–12, 14, 15, 17, 21; p. 26 No. 13. 19, 20, 24, etc., No. 31. 12, 33. 18–19, 33. 33 etc. Cf. also id., *Lois Sacrées de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1955); id., *Supplément de Lois Sacrées des Cités Grecques* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1962), esp. Suppl. 115 A and B. C. Riedel, *Alliteration bei den drei grossen griechischen Tragikern* (Ph. D. diss., Erlangen: Universitäts-Buchdruckerei, 1900), p. 8, associates the *figura etymologica* and alliteration with the rhetorical figures. E. Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, 5th. ed., 2 vols. (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1958), 1: 161 with n. 3, considers the style of the old German "Rechtssprüche," in which alliteration is conspicuous, as pertaining to an elevated Prose.

¹²⁾ For this term I am indebted to Prof. Krateros Ioannou at the University of Thrace. With this I mean the repetition of entire phrases within a contract or document over and over again.

hand are unmistakable. The equivocal nature of the *Sacred Laws*, consequently, obstructs our attempt to make a clear distinction of type of diction (religious vs. judicial), which nature, if coupled with the late date of these *Laws*, should make us rather cautious: the roots of alliteration are not easy to disentangle.

Besides, alliteration is found in both secular (Homer, Archilochus, Tyrtaeus et al.) and religious contents (e.g., in the *Partheneion* of Alcman). The entire archaic choral lyric has been considered a “Kultlyrik,”¹³⁾ but we should not characterize its language as “religious,” as an unalloyed, pure language pertaining to this genre exclusively. The extensive use of heroic myths and themes in choral lyric poetry, especially in the poetry of Stesichorus, has conditioned its language and has possibly blunted the borderlines between epic and religious language. The distinction of types of diction is, consequently, an almost impossible task. In conclusion, we lack sufficient evidence to demonstrate that alliteration is endemic in hieratic or liturgical language and by extension, that the alliterated *θεοὶ θέσαν* (P.L. 205) derives from this kind of literature. Hence we cannot convincingly and safely argue that on this ground Stesichorus is not indebted to Homer.

The second claim of Gallavotti, that Stesichorus was not acquainted with Homeric poetry inevitably touches upon the highly controversial issue of the origins, nature and manner of transmission of Homeric poetry. A detailed discussion of this vast subject is beyond the scope of this present work, but it suffices to say epigrammatically that there is not any proof whatsoever that the Western Greeks had no access to the Homeric poems. By contrast, the evidence of a high literary activity in the Greek West and of a constant trafficking and exchange of ideas between the Western colonies and mainland Greece suggests that the former must have known Homer. The work of Stesichorus himself testifies that: his *Nostoi* (PMG 209) have been modelled on the *Odyssey* (15.115–119, 160–181), and his *Geryoneis* (SLG 15 col. ii. 14–17) on the *Iliad* (8.306–308). The lyric poet borrows his themes from the epic poet, but rehandles them with a penetrating sensitivity, humanism and realism, as I have argued elsewhere.¹⁴⁾

In view of the above considerations then, I simply wonder, if the traditional language of oral epic was crystallized and immortalized

¹³⁾ Burkert, p. 27.

¹⁴⁾ In my diss., pp. 27–35.

in the Homeric epics, which constituted the monumental composition in that genre, and if these poems were indeed widely known and circulating by Stesichorus' time, why should we apply to pre-Homeric stages in order to explain certain Stesichorean features, when these very features are present already in Homer? Tradition has found its best expression in Homer; Homer *is* tradition on which subsequent poets have drawn, more or less successfully. An insight into Stesichorus' aptitude to use the traditional Homeric language will be given below with the examination of the two formulae of the P. Lille poem.

The formula *θεοὶ θέσαν* is used by Homer in situations adverse for mortals, in which the gods are the authors of damage or evil. In the *Odyssey* 11.274 the parricide and incest committed by Oedipus were revealed by the gods – *ἄφαρ δ' ἀνάπυστα θεοὶ θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν*.¹⁵⁾ This revelation, however, caused a series of other painful events, namely, the suffering of Oedipus and the suicide of Iocaste. In the *Odyssey* 11.555 the distribution of Achilles' arms led Ajax to his death. The death-causing arms are designated as the source of destruction and harm – *τὰ δὲ πῆμα θεοὶ θέσαν Ἀργείοισιν*. In the *Iliad* 9.637 the expression is found in relation to the *mênis* of Achilles. Ajax reproaches Achilles for not accepting the recompense offered to him and says, “*σοὶ δ' ἄλληκτόν τε κακὸν τε/θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι θεοὶ θέσαν εἴνεκα κούρης/οἴης*.” The consequences of this obdurate heart or spirit need no further elaboration; they are well known. Penelope considers Eurycleia's stupidity to be inflicted upon her by the gods; “*μάργην σε θεοὶ θέσαν*,” says Penelope (*Od.* 23.11) and characterizes the situation as *βλάβη*, “*οἶ* [viz. *οἱ θεοὶ*] *σέ περ ἔβλαψαν*” (*ibid.*, 14). In all four examples the formula *θεοὶ θέσαν* is accompanied by a description or characterization of the evils provoked by the gods, and it seems to have acquired ominous connotations.

Stesichorus uses this expression – *θεοὶ θέσαν* – in an environment in which the uncertainty and ambiguity of human feelings and relations is emphasized (P. L. 204–210):

¹⁵⁾ Gallavotti, “Da Stesicoro ad Empedocle,” pp. 416–417, sees a decayed formula in *Od.* 11.274 as well as in *Od.* 11.555 and *Il.* 9.633 [mispr. for 9.637], where the formula is used in a stereotyped manner, and even in the ironic phrase of *Od.* 23.11. He contraposes the casual use of Homer with the solemnity of Stesichorus and concludes that the language of Stesichorus is more archaic and retains the profound linguistic values of the original religious concepts.

οὔτε γὰρ αἰὲν ὁμῶς
θεοὶ θέσαν ἀθάνατοι κατ'αἶαν ἱράν
νεῖκος ἔμπεδον βροτοῖσιν
οὐδέ γα μὰν φιλότατ' ἐπίδ α .. νοο

θεοὶ τιθεῖσι
μαντοσύνας δὲ τεάς, ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων
μὴ πάσας τελέσσαι.

In this epode (204–210) the basic theme is the instability and fluidity of human emotions. Homeric concepts and images have been remodelled so as to create a climate of hope and light. This motivation underlies the transformation of the Homeric Eris from one who walks on earth and casts *νεῖκος ὁμοῖον* (*Il.* 4. 443–444) to an Eris entirely subjected to the will of the Olympian gods who have set Eris on earth *οὔτε γὰρ αἰὲν ὁμῶς* (204). The Homeric *ὁμοῖον* is strongly negated by the Stesichorean *οὔτε ὁμῶς*. The gods are the dispensers of this alteration for the benefit of the mortals; the gods appear then as sources of hope rather than of despair. The Homeric formula is used, consequently, in a different context and emits a different spirit. However, the gloomy atmosphere that usually accompanies the formula has been transferred to the following strophe (211–217):

αἰ δέ με παῖδας ἰδέσθαι α αμ .. τας
μόριμόν ἐστιν ἐπεκλώσαν δὲ Μοῖραι,
αὐτίκα μοι θανάτου τέλος στυγεροῖο γέγ[οιτο,
πρὶν τόκα ταῦτ' ἐσιδεῖν
ἄλλγε(ς)ι πολύκτονα δακρυόεντα[--
παῖδας ἐνὶ μεγάροισι
θανόντας ἢ πόλιν ἀλοΐσαν.

The P. Lille mother acknowledges the irrevocable and inexorable power of the Fates and wishes to die before their decrees are fulfilled. She seems to denounce the Homeric thesis that the Fates instill endurance in the human heart against the adversities of life, “*τλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν*” (*Il.* 24. 49). In this Homeric example the verb *θέσαν* enacts a work of benevolence effected by the Fates.

These stanzas (204–217) of the P. Lille poem present an interesting stratification of divine powers. The principles of *Philotes* and *Neikos* are disposed of by becoming subordinate to the will of the gods. The Fates are also subtly bypassed with the help of the hypothetical “if” (211), although their impact is admittedly over-

whelming. The gods are brought into the foreground as authors of both friendship and enmity. This dual aspect of divine action creates an ambivalence, which, in turn, instills hopes for the future. In this ambiguous context in which the evil is underplayed, the original ominous implications of the formula *θεοὶ θέσαν* are skillfully neutralized and suppressed. The heroine considers the gods to be manipulable and capable of saving or destroying, as her indirect appeals to them indicate (209–210, 228–230). This manipulation of the formula *θεοὶ θέσαν* initiates us into the art of Stesichorus. The poet seeks to create distant echoes to construct a climate of innuendoes and ambivalence, to construct illusion so well known from tragedy, and so to make the eventual fall more painful and severe.

The second Homeric formula which Stesichorus has used unchanged is the *ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων* (P. L. 209). I believe that this formula, too, has been chosen consciously because of its connotations and intrinsic value, and has been integrated imaginatively in the plot of the poem. To prove this, however I will have to establish first the meaning and function of this formula in Homer.

This Homeric formula is always found in a clausal position, and has been considered the prototype of *ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων*, as it is suggested by the “distinctive” epithet *ἐκάεργος*.¹⁶) The two formulae are metrically equivalent and as such they have been considered exchangeable and convenient metrical fillers.¹⁷) With this approach, these expressions lose their identity and are lumped together in the wide category of expedient metrical apparatus. A close study of the context in which these formulae occur, however, suggests that they have a distinct meaning, despite their metrical equivalence. Since my cardinal project is to point out why Stesichorus preferred the one phrase over the other, I must explore the meaning of both of them in

¹⁶) M. Parry, *TE*, pp.177–178, explains the equivalent formulae as the natural result of the operation of analogy. Commenting on our two formulae, he says, “The latter expression [*ἄναξ ἐκάεργος* A.], containing the distinctive epithet of the god, is undoubtedly the older; the former [*ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς* A.] derives from *Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱὸς* (A 9), *Διὸς υἱὸν ἐκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα* (A 21), etc.,” M. Parry concedes that in these equivalent noun-epithet formulae one can see “not evidence of the time of composition, but unconscious traits of some one poet who expressed himself by his choice of one or the other” (ibid., p. 177). This choice I do not consider haphazard or unconscious.

¹⁷) So M. Parry, *TE*, pp. 38–40; J. B. Hainsworth, *The Flexibility of the Homeric Formula* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 5–8, 31.

their full or shortened form, given that *Διὸς υἱὸς* and *ἑκάεργος* are the important words.¹⁸⁾

The role of *ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς* is detected in the sixteenth book of the *Iliad*: Zeus, whose intent is stronger than that of men, puts fury in the breast of Patroclus and makes him charge against Ilium (*Il.* 16. 684–691). Patroclus would capture the city if Apollo did not fling him back thrice. The fourth time Apollo warns Patroclus to hold back because neither for him nor for Achilles is there *aisa* to sack Troy (707–709). Patroclus withdraws, while Apollo in the disguise of Asius urges Hector to fight, *τῷ μιν ἐεισάμενος προσέφη Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων* (719). There follows a battle in which the Achaeans excel *ὑπὲρ αἶσαν* (780) until Patroclus “equal to a god” (784) meets Phoebus Apollo who strips him of his armor. When Apollo starts to disarm the Greek hero, he is called Phoebus, whereas, when the process is finished, he is called *ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς* (804). Meanwhile Zeus has manifested his approval of the actions of his son by giving Patroclus’ helm to Hector (799–800).

These events originate from the intent of Zeus (687–691) and from the decrees of *aisa* (707–708). Apollo intervenes when the plans of his father and *aisa* are threatened, with the purpose of defending and upholding them. In this respect Apollo functions as the proxy or deputy of his father and *aisa* whose plans he executes.

Apollo is invested with the same authority in *Iliad* 17: the Achaeans would have captured Ilium and won glory beyond the allotment of Zeus – *καὶ ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν* (321) – had not Apollo himself aroused Aeneas, *τῷ [Περίφρασι] μιν ἐεισάμενος προσέφη Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων* (326). Apollo, son of Zeus, acts on behalf of his father so as to maintain the divine ordinances.

The same underlying principles are observed in the *Iliad* 20: Zeus sends the gods out to fight on the side of their beloved ones in fear lest Achilles sack Troy *ὑπὲρ μῶρον* (20. 30). Obeying the command of his father, Apollo, in the likeness of Lycaon, tries to encourage Aeneas speaking to him as (*ἄναξ*) *Διὸς υἱὸς* (20. 82, 103). It is true that Apollo reveals his own partisanship of the Trojans on this occasion, but this detail is presently irrelevant, since the injunctions of Zeus hang in the background and overshadow the personal likes or

¹⁸⁾ For my references I have relied on G.L. Prendergast, *A Complete Concordance to the Iliad of Homer*, new ed. rev. and enl. by B. Marzullo (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1962), and on H. Dunbar, *A Complete Concordance to the Odyssey of Homer*, new ed. rev. and enl. by B. Marzullo (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1962).

dislikes of the other gods. Apollo acts exactly as a “son of Zeus” is supposed and expected to: he obeys the paternal commands.

In the above passages I discern a connecting line: when Apollo serves the interests of Zeus, *aisa* or *moros*, his title is (*ἄναξ*) *Διὸς υἱός*. He performs his filial duties primarily and it is only incidental or irrelevant that these duties converge and coincide with his own preferences. Apollo’s actions are determined by the choice of forces superior to him. This title, consequently, defines Apollo’s position in the divine rank in genealogical terms, prescribes and circumscribes the range of his actions. Apollo *ἄναξ Διὸς υἱός* represents the divine dispensation.

These connotations of the formula are exploited by Pandaros, when he urges the Trojans to fight in the belief that he will soon kill Diomedes, and says, “*εἰ ἐτέόν με / ὤρσεν ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς ἀπορνύμενον Λυκίηθεν*” (*Il.* 5. 104–105). The formula is broken not only to cause surprise but also to evoke therewith the image of Apollo executing the decrees of his father or of fate. It is the first time that the poet puts the formula in the mouth of a mortal and for psychological reasons, I suspect: Pandaros implicitly associates his presence at Troy with a divine scheme, lends authority and force to his admonitions, and he thus foreshadows victory, under the ironic look of the poet.

There are two more examples of this formula which I have decided to examine separately, because they do not conform with the system outlined above. In the seventh book of the *Iliad* we are presented with a potential conflict: Athena and Apollo have descended to earth to support their favorites. There is a heavy atmosphere, the electricity of which is subtly and skillfully discharged with the use of expressions such as *ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων* (7. 23, 37) and *Διὸς θύγατερ μέγαλοιο* (7. 24) which emphasize the blood kinship of the two gods. These phrases create a climate of affection and avert the outbreak of a clash between the two siblings. In this context Apollo “son of Zeus” correlates with Athena “daughter of Zeus” and both point to a common lineage and to the expected and concomitant feelings.

The foregoing survey has made it clear, hopefully, that the formula (*ἄναξ*) *Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων* is consciously employed in the *Iliad* in order to mark the role and position of Apollo vis-à-vis certain superior powers. This formula, however, is not semasiologically exchangeable with the (*ἄναξ*) *ἐκάεργος* (*Ἀπόλλων*), and, despite the convenience of having two metrical alternants, the poet of the *Iliad* uses

them in different contexts to suggest different things, as will be shown below.

The key word in the formula ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων is the epithet ἐκάεργος because it specifies the action of the god. Its meaning and its etymology are subject to controversy. Some scholars derive it from ἐκᾶς (cf. ἔκαθεν) + εἶργω or ἐργάζομαι,¹⁹ some from *Fexǎ* (cf. ἐκῶν and σάφα).²⁰ Depending on what the first compound is considered to be the epithet has been translated either as “working (or prohibiting) from afar,” or as “working (or prohibiting) of his own free will.” Under these circumstances the best and safest method is to examine closely the adjective in its natural environment, that is, in the context of the Homeric passages in which it occurs.

In the first book of the *Iliad* the epithet ἐκάεργος is used at a crucial point in the story, that is, when the Achaeans acknowledge the *mēnis* of Apollo who has so far been a sender of *loigos*, ἐκατηβόλος or ἐκατηβελέτης (37–53, 75–96, 110) thus punishing the dishonor done to his priest and himself (cf. v. 21, ἄζόμενοι). As soon as Agamemnon decides to placate the god, he calls him ἐκάεργος (147). Later, when the Greeks offer sacrifices and atonements to Apollo, the epithet reappears: the Greeks sing a paean to ἐκάεργος (474) and ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων sends them wind good for sailing (479). It seems that the debut of this epithet coincides with a change in the attitude of the Achaeans, and marks a new phase in their relation

¹⁹ Etym. Mag. 319.51–52; Eust. 72.15.138.23; H. Ebeling, *Lexikon Homericum*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1885; repr. ed. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 1: 379: “averruncus, qui procul arcet; vulgo: in longinquum operans, longe iaculans;” C. Capelle, *Vollständiges Wörterbuch über die Gedichte des Homeros und der Homeriden*, 10th ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), p. 182 with n. 2: “fernabwehrend, der Abwehler, Schirmer, averruncus.” Of similar opinion are: Doederlein, Autenrieth, Hentze, Nitzsch, Ameis, Ludwig, Kuhn, Grohmann et alii.

²⁰ Bechtel, *Lexilogus* (unavailable to me) quoted by P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots*, 4 vols. (Paris: éditions Klincksieck, 1968), 1: 327–328: “agissant librement, tout puissant.” E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1916 and Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1916), pp. 232, 236–237: “aggissant à son gré.” J. B. Hofmann, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1949), p. 75: “nach eigenem Belieben wirkend.” H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 2 vols. (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1960), 1: 473 mentions “fernschirmend” and “fernwirkend,” but prefers “freiwirkend” or “freiwaltend.” For its origin from *Fexǎ* see E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik*, 4th ed., 3 vols. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1938), 1: 439–440 n. 8.

with the god. The adjective could mean "Preservateur,"²¹⁾ since Apollo stayed the plague, but this is preposterous because Apollo himself had provoked the devastation. The epithet *ἐκάεργος* marks the transition from enmity to friendship, the tangible proof of which is the withdrawal of the plague and the sending of wind good for sailing.²²⁾ In this respect Agamemnon (147) uses the epithet in a proleptic sense (although prematurely) just as Chryses had done before with the epithet *ἐκηβόλος* (14, 21). Agamemnon prefers to look forward to the future and his reconciliation with the god instead of brooding over the present plight that has originated from the god's hostility. For Agamemnon *ἐκάεργος* means "appeased, atoned, benevolent."

The *Iliad* 5 reveals some other nuances of the epithet. In the background, the Greeks and the Trojans are engaged in fierce fighting. Athena proposes to Ares that both remain impartial and let that party win to whichever Zeus gives glory (34–35). A little later, however, she changes her mind and bids Diomedes to fight. Diomedes leaps upon Aeneas, "although he knows that Apollo holds forth his arms above him" (433) and he fails to respect the god (cf. 434 *ἄζετο*). The fourth time that Diomedes *daimoni isos* (438) rushes upon the god, he encounters a threatening *ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων* (439) who gives him a lecture about the limits of mortals. Diomedes withdraws and avoids the wrath, *μῆνιν ἐκατηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος* (444).

The above passage gives us a hint of etymological nature: Athena, Ares and Apollo act on their own and independently of Zeus, who has not interfered yet in the action (cf. 34–35). Apollo *ἐκάεργος* exhibits his *philia* to his beloved ones, acts *φειλά*, that is, willingly to protect his favorites. As *ἐκάεργος* Apollo exhibits these feelings for his protégés, which if proved by deeds, will be characterized by the distressed party as the work of *ἐκατηβόλος* Apollo. In the company of the *daimoni isos* (438) the ominous connotations of which are well known,²³⁾ the epithet *ἐκάεργος* takes on another dimension and assumes the implications of potential threat for life. This threat is explicitly mentioned by Dione later on (406–416), but presently it is

²¹⁾ So Chantraine, 1: 327. Cf., however, Burkert, p.228: "Apollons Pfeile bedeuten im ersten Iliasbuch die Pest; der Heilgott ist zugleich Pestgott."

²²⁾ So also F. G. Welcker, *Kleine Schriften*, No. 3 (Bonn: E. Weber, 1850; repr. ed. Osnabrück: Otto Zeller, 1973), p. 37 with n. 3: "... versöhnt, als er den A-chäern Fahrtwind gibt, wird er *ἐκάεργος* genannt 479, wie im Pāan 474 (d. i. Abwehrer)."

²³⁾ See Whitman, pp. 114–115, 200; Nagy, pp. 143–144, 293–294.

only implicitly foreshadowed. It seems to me that the *ἐκάεργος* and *ἐκατηβόλος* are complementary; the former forewarns about the inimical intentions of the god, while the latter materializes the intentions and turns them into deeds. In this context the *ἐκάεργος* acquires portentous overtones and points to the double face or function of Apollo who can thus be the champion as well as the destroyer respectively.

The menacing quality of the epithet is subtly hinted at in the story of Marpessa: Apollo abducts her, but Idas, who also woos the girl, raises his bow against the god (*Il.* 9.559–560). Apollo is called again *ἐκάεργος* but in a sentence relating the grief of Marpessa's mother, *κλαῖεν, ὃ μιν ἐκάεργος ἀνήρπασε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων* (564). Despite this displacement of the epithet, the situation here is comparable with that of *Il.* 5.439: a mortal commits a *hybris* by antagonizing the god. The epithet emits the same message: potential death for the impious. On both occasions, however, the forewarning remains on the level of the potential and is not fulfilled because in *Iliad* 5 Diomedes withdraws, while in *Iliad* 9 Zeus intervenes and gives a solution.

The full range of implications of the epithet is given epigrammatically by Achilles in two cases. First, when he advises Patroclus not to lead to Ilium in fear lest one of the Olympian gods interferes in the fray, *“μάλα τοὺς γε φιλεῖ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων”* (*Il.* 16.94). The death of Patroclus is implicitly hinted at here. Second, when he complains to Apollo saying in indignation, *“ἔβλαψάς μ', ἐκάεργε, θεῶν ὀλοώτατε πάντων”* (*Il.* 22.15), *νῦν δ' ἐμὲ μὲν μέγα κῦδος ἀφείλεο, τοὺς δὲ σάωσας* (18). These actions – saving one's own friends and harming their enemies – specify the content of the epithet *ἐκάεργος* and demonstrate the emotional commitment of the god (*Φεκᾶ*). Moreover, they remind us of the double face of Apollo *ἐκάεργος* who incorporates in himself the contrasting but interrelated qualities of benefactor and malefactor, depending on the experience of the mortal involved in a particular scene.

The use of the epithet by Achilles, especially in *Iliad* 22.15, where it is so potent and revealing exactly because it is so plain, deserves our close attention. This is the second example in which the epithet is found in the speech of a Greek hero. In the first it was used by Agamemnon in a proleptic sense as soon as he decided to propitiate the god. In the context of the *Iliad* 1 the adjective seems to be used with an apotropaic intent, as if to vouchsafe the championship of the god. In all the other instances the epithet is employed by the Greek

poet-narrator to characterize the god. The poet does not allow the Trojan heroes to utter the epithet. I suspect that the word is looked upon with a certain awe, generates an uncomfortable feeling and the Greeks are sensitive about it. Achilles is the only hero who utters it in a direct speech in his dialogue with Apollo. Achilles breaks the conventions and bravely declares the truth about Apollo *ἐκάεργος*. This kind of "misuse of the epic language"²⁴) finds its explanation in the *physis* and peculiar psychology of the hero. Achilles is the man whose alter ego (Patroclus) has been killed by Apollo and Hector, is the man who scorns the divine decrees and surpasses the limits set for mortals (*Il.* 24. 39–54, esp. 49). Although he is fully aware of his impending death (*Il.* 19. 408–423), he goes out to meet it. He provokes his own death by killing Hector. His fearless and indomitable nature is not intimidated by blasting (*ἐκατηβόλος*) Apollo. Uppermost in his mind is not the survival of his body, but of his honor, which has been marred and obstructed by the favoritism and partisanship of Apollo *ἐκάεργος*. Achilles, ready for death, dares tell the truth about the hidden meaning of the epithet: from the point of view of the Greeks *ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων* is *ολώτατος πάντων θεῶν*.

The functions of *ἐκάεργος* Apollo are clearly illustrated in the fifteenth book of the *Iliad*. The poet relates how Poseidon incurs Zeus' rage for conferring victory on the Greeks before Achilles' honor is reinstated (1–77). Zeus sends Iris to Poseidon with the message that he cease from war, and Apollo to encourage Hector so as to turn the Achaeans to flight. Zeus appeals to the martial quality in Apollo (229–233). Apollo obeys his father (236), and standing by Hector speaks to him as *ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων* (243), in an affectionate tone, thus setting the atmosphere that penetrates his subsequent speech (253–261):

Τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπεν ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων
"θάρασει νῦν τοῖόν τοι ἄοσητήρα Κρονίων
ἐξ Ἰδης προέηκε παρεστάμεναι καὶ ἀμύνειν,
Φοῖβον Ἀπόλλωνα χρυσάορον, ὃς σε πάρος περ
ῥύομ', ὁμῶς αὐτόν τε καὶ αἰπεινὸν πτολίεθρον.
ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἵππεῦσιν ἐπότερνον πολέεσσι
νησὶν ἐπι γλαφυρῆσιν ἐλαυνέμεν ὠκέας ἵππους·
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ προπάροιθε κιῶν ἵπποισι κέλευθον
πᾶσαν λειανέω, τρέψω δ' ἥρωας Ἀχαιοὺς."

²⁴) For other examples of misuse of the epic language by Achilles see A. Parry, "The language of Achilles," pp. 5–7.

The speech of Apollo specifies the feelings and range of action of *ἐκάεργος* with incontestable clarity and precision. *Ἐκάεργος* is the god who, out of loyalty known of old, offers moral and factual assistance (cf. *θάρασει, ἀοσσητήρα, παρεστάμεναι, ἀμύνειν, ῥύομαι, λειανέω, τρέπω*). It is noteworthy that Zeus calls Apollo *ἐκατηβόλε* (231), Apollo calls himself *Φοῖβον Ἀπόλλωνα χρυσάορον* (256), whereas a third person, the Greek poet-narrator, encapsulates the role of Apollo in a “distinctive” epithet, *ἐκάεργος*.

At an earlier point I suggested that the formula *ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων* appears in cases where Apollo executes paternal commands or defends the validity of the decrees of *aisa* and *moros*. One may argue that the passage of the *Iliad* 15.220–261 disconfirms this suggestion on the ground that Apollo executes his father’s orders, but, despite this, he is named *ἐκάεργος*. This inconsistency is only a seeming one and can be accounted for if we examine *how* Apollo delivers the injunctions he has received. Zeus prescribes a general course of action of military character – the Greeks should be routed with the help of Apollo. Zeus’ speech has no place for emotions as a mere juxtaposition with the speech of Apollo clearly demonstrates. By contrast, Apollo’s speech is permeated by love and affection, by concern for Hector. His speech is by no means verbally a replica of the speech of his father, but, on the contrary, a spontaneous creation underlined by a remarkable freedom and independence on the level of diction and of action. Apollo comes emphatically to the foreground as a protector and partisan above all. He does not lose his identity despite his service to Zeus, but he displays a strong individuality, an intense and willing involvement in this mission. In this case the formula *Διὸς υἱός*, which suggests acquiescence and submission to Zeus or *aisa* and *moros* is unnecessary. The individuality of Apollo shines out; this is the focal point. It is interesting that, when Apollo acts as *Διὸς υἱός*, he appears in disguise (*ἔεισάμενος, Il. 16.719, 17.326, 20.82*), thus losing his identity. With the exception of *Iliad* 17.585, however, when Apollo acts as *ἐκάεργος* he does so in his own person; he is his true self, namely, the god of succour who works a “great miracle,” as one of Hector’s comrades puts it (*Il. 15.286*).

The nature of Apollo’s actions is discerned also in *Iliad* 17.545–596. A series of events constitutes the background: there is a fight over Patroclus’ body. Zeus dispatches Athena to urge on the Danaans because his mind was turned (545–546). The battle is raging when *ἐκάεργος* Apollo, in the likeness of Phaenops, urges Hector to

fight. Hector strides out (592) and at this very moment Zeus shakes his aegis and gives victory to the Trojans (596).

In the above scene Apollo *ἐκάεργος* acts not only voluntarily and independently of Zeus, but also in defiance of Zeus' will (cf. 545–546). The unconstrained and willing character of Apollo's actions is indubitable. One would expect a vehement retaliation by Zeus; the *Iliad* offers ample evidence of his propensity to this. To our surprise, however, Zeus sides with Apollo and sanctions the Trojan victory. The key to this story may be found in the participle *ἔεισάμενος*. I suspect that there is here a fusion of two images and functions, that of Apollo "the son of Zeus," who usually works on his father's behalf and in disguise, on the one hand, and that of Apollo *ἐκάεργος*, who usually acts on his own behalf and in his own person, on the other. The incongruity of these images is muffled or glossed over artistically with the insertion of the participle, which has a certain evocative power. The expected and potential clash between father and son is thus skillfully avoided and Zeus' face and honor is saved. Apollo remains the voluntary champion of the Trojans, but with the approval of his father.

The image of *ἐκάεργος* Apollo as the partisan of the Trojans emerges equally clearly from the *Iliad* 21.458–600. In the *concilium deorum* Poseidon accuses Apollo of favoring the Trojans (*φέρεις χάριν*, 458), and of protecting them. Apollo *ἐκάεργος* shuns the conflict (461–469) and seeks reconciliation. For this attitude he incurs the rage of Artemis who addresses him "*ἐκάεργε*" (472) in a disparaging and contemptuous manner, as if he has betrayed his loyalty to the Trojans. However, *ἐκάεργος* Apollo leaves the gathering in silence (472) for he is concerned lest the Danaans beyond what is ordained – *ὑπὲρ μόρον* (517) – should sack Troy.

The presence of *ὑπὲρ μόρον* in this narrative may momentarily evoke the image of Apollo serving the interest of Zeus, *aisa* and *moros*, but the leisurely description of Apollo's reactions and actions during and after the assembly of the gods leaves no doubt that herein Apollo has a mind of his own, is a free-willed and resolute person rather than an obedient agent. This is the impression he has given to Poseidon as well, who invites him to join the other gods and destroy the Trojans (459–460). This portrayal of Apollo is continued in *Iliad* 22. The emphasis on Apollo's salutary and dedicated interventions as well as the hammering effect that results from the frequency of the epithet *ἐκάεργος* (*Il.* 21.461, 472, 478, 600) muffle the force of the *ὑπὲρ μόρον* and make it just another excuse for Apollo

to pursue his own interests. The connotative or associative value of the *ὑπὲρ μόρον* is thus suppressed significantly.

Finally, the well-known quality of Apollo *ἐκάεργος* is acknowledged by Athena (*Il.* 22.220), but at this point in the plot it is considered ineffective and futile any longer.

By contrast to the *Iliad*, Apollo *ἐκάεργος* appears only once in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 8.323), but definitely not in the role outlined above. And this stage we may witness a routine usage of formulae.²⁵⁾

To recapitulate, the foregoing survey has suggested that M. Parry's general observations about the economy of the epic language are operative in the particular case of the two formulae analyzed above. The formulae *ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων* and *ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων* are metrically but not semasiologically equivalent and consequently, they cannot be used alternatively.²⁶⁾ The epithet *ἐκάεργος*, which is of central importance because it occurs in the P. Lille poem, has shown to be a special or particularized epithet²⁷⁾ in relation to the immediate actions: it is a constant accompaniment of Apollo whenever he is involved in voluntary actions that benefit the Trojans. The adjective can be rendered as: the self-chosen, voluntary champion and partisan, who works so as to avert an imminent disaster from his beloved ones (*Фекă + ἐργάζεσθαι* or *εἶργειν*). In doing so, however, Apollo is invested with two antithetical but complementary powers. He is a savior and castigator at the same time, whence the adjective *ἐκάεργος* acquires its ambiguity and ominous overtones.

In the light of the foundation work done so far we may now return to the P. Lille poem and probe the motives of Stesichorus in preferring the one formula – *ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων* (209) – over the other.

The two stanzas (vv.204–217 cited already) present a carefully wrought canvas of religious and cosmological ideas expounded in a

²⁵⁾ The analysis of the formula in the *Homeric Hymns* is beyond the scope of this study. An attempt has been made in my diss., pp.126–128.

²⁶⁾ M. Parry, "Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse-Making. I. Homer and Homeric Style," in *The Making of the Homeric Verse*, pp.277–278, believes that they can replace each other.

²⁷⁾ Besides the contextual indications, if we apply here the criterion of Hainsworth – productivity – for determining whether or not *ἐκάεργος* is a special epithet we get an affirmative answer: the epithet appears in oblique cases and not in a stereotyped sequence of words; it has an autonomous status (cf. *Il.* 1.474; 21.472; 22.15).

climactic manner. First comes the instability of *Philotes* and *Neikos*, then the instability of *noos*, both of which are made dependent on the variable and unpredictable will of the gods, and finally come the Fates whose might is irrevocable and dreaded. This kind of stratification has a *logos* in it: the emphasis on the divinely imposed impermanence of human feelings and social relations (204–208) aims not only at challenging the premises of the prediction of Teiresias (211–217), but also at opening up a channel of communication directly with the gods. In the belief that the gods are the controlling factors in the cosmic instability, the P. Lille mother appeals to Apollo, the divine seer par excellence, beseeching him to control the present domestic instability and to discredit the prophecies, at least partially (209–210). Apollo is implored to become the champion he was in the *Iliad*.

The heroine wishes that Apollo may fulfill “not all” of the predictions, but, if necessary at any rate, most a part of them. Syntactically the adjective *πάσας* has the predicate position,²⁸) and this restricts the meaning of “all”. We may attribute an ethographical value to the distich (209–210): the P. Lille mother accosts the god in humility comparable to that of Danaë (Sim. *PMG* 543.25–27) and limits her demands in fear she has asked too much. Beside this interpretation, however, the position and content of this distich reveals that it has a structural and thematic significance as well. The wish to Apollo is embraced by two contrasting themes, that of hope and light, on the one side (204–208) and that of despair and darkness, on the other (211–217). The hope of a partial at least escape serves as a mediator and blends the two antithetical realities. In this respect the distich links the two strophes functioning as a *γέφυρα*-sentence and promotes the climactic uncoiling of the ideas.

In such a context and in the company of the *μη πάσας*, the conceptual depth of the adjective *ἐκάεργος* is revealed. The two faces of Apollo *ἐκάεργος* are presented in relief: he is called upon as a protector, but the “not all” treacherously brings to the surface the latent inimical qualities of the god. The “not all” discloses artfully the secret and untold yet fears of the Queen, and gives a tragic programmatic value to the entire phrase. It suggests that the P. Lille Apollo may appear in a role similar to the role he plays in the Theban tragedies, especially the *Septem* of Aeschylus. It is to be regretted, at

²⁸) See H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956) p. 296, § 1174.

any rate, that the P. Lille fragments cannot confirm this detail.

To conclude this study, the Homeric formula ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων has been integrated in the P. Lille poem on both structural and conceptual levels. It has not been used in an unimaginative and imitative manner for its metrical value and for its Homeric ring – in which case the ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων could very well fit – but, on the contrary, it has been chosen consciously for its potential to convey contradictory ideas and messages, and to portray the god in a synthetic manner. As with the θεοὶ θέσαν before, so with this formula now, the poet demonstrates his talent and dexterity to use the epic linguistic material not mechanically but imaginatively, so as to insinuate certain ideas and to create a climate of suspense by foreshadowing events. The poet thus succeeds in making his lyric poems read and feel like tragedy. We are dealing with a real work of art, therefore, which is not flamboyant, but gently penetrating and suggestive.²⁹⁾

Ein Versuch zur Etymologie des Namens Ἀπόλλων

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Der Name Ἀπόλλων kommt in den homerischen Epen und im darauffolgenden griechischen Schrifttum vor. Außer der Form Ἀπόλλων finden sich inschriftlich auch die Formen: Ἀπειλών einmal (zyprisch)¹⁾, Ἀπέλων einmal (pamphylich)²⁾ und Ἀπέλλων mehrfach (dorisch)³⁾. Bemerkenswert ist die über die Form Ἀπέλλων von Verrius Flaccus bzw. Sextus Pompeius Festus (2. Jh. n.

²⁹⁾ I would like to thank Prof. A. W. H. Adkins for his kindness to read my manuscript and to offer me valuable comments.

¹⁾ Siehe *Ed. Schwyzer*, *Dialectorum graecarum exempla epigraphica potiora*, Leipzig 1923 (Nachdr. Hildesheim 1960), S. 332: 682, 15 τῶι θιῶι τῶι Ἀπειλῶνι τῶι Ἐλεῖτῶι. *Ol. Masson*, *Les inscriptions chypriotes syllabiques. Recueil critique et commenté*, Paris 1961, S. 225 f. [215^b].

²⁾ Siehe *Schwyzer*, a. a. O., S. 335: 686,30 Ἀπέλῶνα.

³⁾ Siehe *Schwyzer*, a. a. O., S. 12: 39,1; 40,1.2.3; S. 90: 179^a2; S. 97: 191,45; S. 98: 193,20; S. 105: 206,3. *E. Burkert*, *Apellai und Apollon*, *Rh. Mus.* 118 (1975) 6 ff.